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Softwood Lumber’s “Termite” Problem1  
WHY THE EXTENSION OF THE 2006 SOFTWOOD 
LUMBER AGREEMENT IS RIGHT FOR SOFTWOOD 
LUMBER BUT WRONG FOR THE MULTILATERAL 
TRADING SYSTEM 
INTRODUCTION 
On January 24, 2012, United States Trade Representative 
Ron Kirk and Canadian Minister for International Trade Ed Fast 
signed a two-year extension of the 2006 Softwood Lumber 
Agreement (SLA 2006),2 extending the agreement through 
October 12, 2015.3 The SLA 2006 governs the most notorious 
trade dispute in the history of Canadian-American relations: the 
Canada-United States softwood lumber dispute.4 The softwood 
lumber dispute centers on allegations by the United States that 
the Canadian government unfairly subsidizes its softwood 
  
 1 See JAGDISH BHAGWATI, TERMITES IN THE TRADING SYSTEM: HOW 
PREFERENTIAL AGREEMENTS UNDERMINE FREE TRADE xii (2008). 
 2 Softwood Lumber Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the 
Government of the United States of America, U.S.-Can., Sept. 12, 2006, Temp. State 
Dep’t No. 07-222, KAV 8209, available at http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/3254 (last 
visited Nov. 21, 2012), amended by Agreement Between the Government of Canada 
and the Government of the United States of America Amending the Softwood Lumber 
Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United 
States of America, U.S.-Can., Oct. 12, 2006, Temp. State Dep’t No. 07-223, KAV 8310, 
available at http://www.international.gc.ca/controls-controles/assets/pdfs/softwood/ 
Agreementamending-en.pdf (last visited Sept. 23, 2011) [hereinafter SLA 2006]. 
 3 Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the 
United States of America Extending the Softwood Lumber Agreement Between the 
Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America, as Amended, 
U.S.-Can., Jan. 23, 2012, http://www.international.gc.ca/controls-controles/softwood-bois_ 
oeuvre/other-autres/SLA_2012.aspx?lang=eng&view=d (last visited May 16, 2012). 
 4 See e.g., GREGORY W. BOWMAN, NICK COVELLI, DAVID A. GANTZ & IHN HO 
UHM, TRADE REMEDIES IN NORTH AMERICA 553 (2010) (“The softwood lumber dispute 
between the United States and Canada represents the longest-running and perhaps most 
bitter trade dispute ever between the two countries.”); DAOWEI ZHANG, THE SOFTWOOD 
LUMBER WAR: POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND THE LONG U.S.-CANADIAN TRADE DISPUTE 1 
(2007) (“Since the value of softwood lumber trade currently exceeds US$7 billion 
annually, this disagreement easily ranks as the largest trade dispute between the two 
countries in the modern era, and its longevity has defied many seasoned observers.”). 
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lumber industry, allowing Canadian lumber producers to dump 
their products into the U.S. market at below production cost.5  
In large part, these allegations stem from the countries’ 
differing systems of forest management.6 In the United States, 
forest land is mostly privately owned, and market forces 
generally determine the stumpage fees harvesters must pay for 
timber.7 In Canada, because the majority of its forests are 
considered public land, provincial governments set the fees 
that harvesters must pay.8 Many U.S. lumber producers believe 
that the Canadian system qualifies as a subsidy, by creating 
“chronically below-market-value stumpage charges,”9 and have 
long urged the U.S. government to impose countervailing 
(CVD) and antidumping (AD) duties on imports of Canadian 
softwood products.10 Their claims have led to nearly three 
decades of litigation.11  
This dispute should be of particular concern to both 
Canadians and Americans alike, as Canada is currently the 
United States’ largest trading partner in goods, with the two 
  
 5 See, e.g., Press Release, Coalition for Fair Lumber Imports, U.S. Coalition 
for Fair Lumber Imports Demands Relief from Canadian Subsidies, Dumping (Apr. 2, 
2001), available at http://www.uslumbercoalition.org/doc/4_2_01release.pdf [hereinafter 
Coalition Demands].  
 6 BOWMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 556 (“In the United States, some 70% of 
timberlands are privately owned. In Canada, in contrast, 94% of the forests are on 
provincial or federal government (‘Crown’) lands.”).  
 7 Michael Hart & Bill Dymond, The Cul-de-Sac of Softwood Lumber, 26 
POL’Y OPTIONS no. 9, 2005, at 20. “Stumpage [fees]” are what lumber companies must 
pay for the right to harvest timber. Id. at 19.  
 8 Id. at 19-20.  
 9 Henry Spelter, If America Had Canada’s Stumpage System, 52 FOREST SCI. 
443, 444 (2006). Spelter believes that it is “unclear whether this is a subsidy in the 
sense that the [NAFTA] and [WTO] agreements were meant to deal with, i.e., direct 
financial aid furnished by a government.” Id.  
 10 See, e.g., Coalition Demands, supra note 5. In the United States, a 
domestic industry that believes it is being injured by way of a foreign government 
subsidizing foreign exporters or a foreign producer dumping an export in the United 
States at a price lower than its home market price may file a petition with both the 
International Trade Administration, which is part of the Department of Commerce 
(Commerce), and the International Trade Commission (ITC), which is an independent 
agency. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, An Introduction to U.S. Trade Remedies, IMP. ADMIN., 
http://ia.ita.doc.gov/intro/index.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2011). Commerce determines 
whether the import is, in fact, being subsidized or dumped into the market, while the 
ITC determines whether the import is causing material injury, or threatening to cause 
an injury, to the domestic industry. Id. “If both Commerce and the ITC make 
affirmative findings . . . , Commerce instructs U.S. Customs and Border Protection 
[(CBP)] to assess duties against imports of that product into the United States.” Id.  
 11 Canada-U.S. Softwood Lumber Trade Relations (1982–2006), FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS & INT’L TRADE CAN., http://www.international.gc.ca/controls-controles/softwood-
bois_oeuvre/notices-avis/82-06.aspx?lang=eng&view=d (last modified Apr. 20, 2009).  
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countries trading over $597 billion during 2011 alone.12 More 
specifically, Canada has historically been the largest source of 
lumber imports in the United States.13  
Culminating with the SLA 2006, the most recent 
developments in the softwood lumber dispute resulted from 
what commentators have labeled a “hydra” of litigation.14 
Disputes were settled under Chapters 11 and 19 of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) dispute settlement system, and within 
U.S. domestic courts.15 This overlap is a result of the 
proliferation of preferential trade agreements (PTAs)16 within 
the international trading system, which enable parties to seek 
recourse under multiple dispute settlement regimes.17 Although 
NAFTA contains a choice of forum clause intended to prevent 
overlap in dispute settlement,18 the clause does not apply to 
final AD or CVD determinations, such as those at issue in the 
  
 12 Top Trading Partners, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/ 
foreign-trade/statistics/highlights/top/top1112yr.html (last visited Dec. 19, 2012). 
 13 BOWMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 553.  
 14 John H. Knox, The 2005 Activity of the NAFTA Tribunals, 100 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 429, 436 (2006). 
 15 See infra Part II. 
 16 Preferential trade agreements (also referred to as “regional trade 
agreements”) are agreements by which “parties to [the agreement] offer to each 
other . . . more favorable treatment in trade matters than [what is offered] to the rest of 
the world, including WTO Members.” Rafael Leal-Arcas, Proliferation of Regional 
Trade Agreements: Complementing or Supplanting Multilateralism?, 11 CHI. J. INT’L L. 
597, 600 (2011). PTAs are a “departure from the WTO [most-favored nation] principle 
of non-discrimination,” but are WTO-consistent under three rules: (i) GATT Article 
XXIV:4-10; (ii) the Enabling Clause, and (3) GATT Article V. Id. at 602. The majority of 
PTAs are in the form of free trade agreements (FTAs), such as NAFTA. BHAGWATI, 
supra note 1, at 1. Because even those commentators who use the term “regional trade 
agreements” admit that these agreements “may be . . . concluded between countries not 
necessarily located in the same geographic region,” I believe that PTAs is a more 
accurate label. Leal-Arcas, supra, at 600. Between 1985 and 2005, the share of world 
trade that came from PTAs grew from approximately 20% to around 50%. Id. at 602. To 
date, various states have notified over 500 PTAs to the WTO Secretariat and numerous 
others are currently under negotiation. Regional Trade Agreements, WORLD TRADE 
ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 
2012). Of the 233 PTAs currently in force, approximately 85% are FTAs such as 
NAFTA. See List of All RTAs, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://rtais.wto.org/UI/ 
PublicAllRTAList.aspx (last visited Sept. 12, 2012). 
 17 Jennifer Hillman, Conflicts Between Dispute Settlement Mechanisms in 
Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO—What Should the WTO Do?, 42 CORNELL 
INT’L L.J. 193, 194 (2009) (noting the “problems that can arise from the overlap or 
conflict between these RTA settlement provisions and the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding of the WTO”).  
 18 North American Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of the 
United States of America, the Government of Canada and the Government of the 
United Mexican States, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 2005(6), Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 612, 695 
(1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]. 
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softwood lumber dispute.19 More generally, there is little clarity 
on the exact legal relationship between PTA and WTO dispute 
settlement systems.20 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) Article XXIV addresses only the “formation” of PTAs and 
is silent on issues pertaining to the operational relationship 
between PTAs and the WTO.21 Moreover, there is no overarching 
statute that defines the authority of one tribunal in relation to 
another.22 This uncertainty is directly linked to the superfluous 
litigation discussed below.  
The growth of PTAs has several explanations—most 
notably the stalled Doha Round of multilateral trade 
negotiations23—and the impact PTAs have on the multilateral 
trading system is much debated.24 This debate is beyond the 
scope of the instant analysis. For the purposes of this note, which 
examines a PTA sub-agreement (the SLA 2006),25 I have accepted 
the position that PTAs undercut the multilateral trading system.  
The extension of the SLA 2006 raises two important 
questions: first, what does it mean for the softwood lumber 
dispute itself; and, second, what does it mean for the 
multilateral trading system as a whole? Put differently, if PTAs 
such as NAFTA are the “termites” of the multilateral trading 
system,26 can an agreement spawned from NAFTA’s own failures 
act as an insecticide, helping to exterminate these preferential 
  
 19 Id. at art. 2004. Parties have also been reluctant to rely on NAFTA Article 
2005 even outside the context of AD and CVD cases. Joost Pauwelyn & Luiz Eduardo 
Salles, Forum Shopping Before International Tribunals: (Real) Concerns, (Im)Possible 
Solutions, 42 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 77, 89 (2009). 
 20 Hillman, supra note 17, at 197.  
 21 Sungjoon Cho, Breaking the Barrier Between Regionalism and 
Multilateralism: A New Perspective on Trade Regionalism, 42 HARV. INT’L L.J. 419, 452 
(2001). The Doha Declaration includes a negotiating mandate to clarify and improve 
“disciplines and procedures under the existing WTO provisions applying to regional 
trade agreements.” World Trade Org., Ministerial Declaration of 14 Nov. 2001, ¶ 29, 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002). 
 22 Pauwelyn & Salles, supra note 19, at 84. 
 23 Leal-Arcas, supra note 16, at 621-23 (listing other economic and political 
reasons why countries agree to PTAs so frequently); see also BHAGWATI, supra note 1, 
at 16-47 (listing the “many reasons why PTAs have now turned into a pandemic and a 
pox on the world trading system”). 
 24 See, e.g., Cho, supra note 21, at 429-35; Leal-Arcas, supra note 16, at 623-26. 
 25 The term “PTA sub-agreement” is meant to describe a trade agreement 
between two countries that have already agreed to a PTA. In this analysis, the PTA 
sub-agreement at issue is the SLA 2006, between Canada and the United States who 
are both members of NAFTA. 
 26 BHAGWATI, supra note 1, at xii (“Acting like termites, PTAs are eating 
away at the multilateral trading system relentlessly and progressively.”). But see Leal-
Arcas, supra note 16, at 629 (arguing that RTAs can “complement” multilateralism). I 
should note that termites seem like an especially suitable analogy when discussing a 
trade agreement dealing with softwood lumber. 
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agreements? Or, does such an agreement only add to the forces 
undercutting the long-term prospects for multilateralism?  
This note will argue that parties directly involved in the 
Canadian-American softwood lumber trade should welcome the 
extension of the SLA 2006. But this support should come with 
pause—especially for those who wish to see the global trading 
community return more ardently to the multilateral system. 
While the streamlined dispute settlement process of the SLA 
200627 has thus far proven to be the most effective solution to 
the lumber saga, this is only because the alternative monstrous 
“hydra” of litigation is impracticable. A workable resolution to 
NAFTA’s largest and most bitter dispute that fails to directly 
address the systemic shortcomings of PTAs will only 
temporarily insulate the parties from the underlying problems 
and will draw their attention further away from wholesale 
multilateralism.28 The SLA 2006 is not a grand solution for the 
problems of the multilateral trading system.  
This note is divided into five sections. Part I describes 
the early history of the softwood lumber dispute from 1982 to 
2001. Part II highlights the superfluous litigation that occurred 
between 2001 and 2006, which culminated in the SLA 2006. 
This section provides a brief overview of the disputes that 
occurred within NAFTA, the WTO, and U.S. domestic courts, 
and it highlights the problems that were caused by these 
overlapping dispute settlement mechanisms. Part III provides 
an overview of the SLA 2006 and briefly addresses the disputes 
that have arisen under this agreement. Part IV explains why the 
SLA 2006 is the most practical solution to the softwood lumber 
dispute, arguing that a negotiated agreement with a 
straightforward dispute settlement mechanism is necessary to 
offset the United States’ stubborn political protection of its 
softwood lumber industry. Finally, Part V explains how the 
softwood lumber dispute highlights the shortcomings of PTAs 
and argues that, in the case of NAFTA, taking lumber out of the 
equation removes a major incentive to correct these deficiencies.  
  
 27 SLA 2006, supra note 2, at art. XIV. 
 28 See Michael S. Valihora, NAFTA Chapter 19 or the WTO’s Dispute 
Settlement Body: A Hobson’s Choice for Canada?, 30 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 447, 471 
(1998). (“Perhaps the Softwood Lumber Dispute is simply too big for [NAFTA Chapter 
19], but the mechanism is sufficient in most circumstances.”). This point, made in 1998, 
highlights both the atypical size of the softwood lumber dispute, and the shortcomings 
of NAFTA. A dispute settlement mechanism that is “sufficient in most circumstances” 
is, by its nature, patently insufficient.  
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I. THE EARLY BATTLES—THE HISTORY OF THE SOFTWOOD 
LUMBER DISPUTE (1982–2001) 
The modern history of the softwood lumber dispute is 
best understood as four discrete “battles”29: Lumber I (1982–
1983), Lumber II (1986–1991), Lumber III (1991–1996), and 
Lumber IV (2001–2006).30 As one commentator suggests, this 
history “involves extremely arcane points of anti-dumping and 
countervailing duty law and an extraordinarily convoluted 
litigation history.”31 Despite the protracted nature of the 
dispute, it is important to address each stage in order to 
understand how and why wood has been the source of a thirty-
year trade war. Accordingly, this note will briefly address 
Lumber I, II, and III below.32 This note will discuss Lumber IV 
in greater detail in Part II, given that it culminated in the 
agreement that is the focus of this note: the SLA 2006.33  
A. Lumber I (1982–1983) 
Lumber I began in 1982 when a coalition of U.S. lumber 
producers, later known as the Coalition for Fair Lumber 
Imports (Lumber Coalition), filed a CVD petition with the 
Department of Commerce (Commerce).34 The petition alleged 
that the Canadian government subsidized softwood lumber 
through various programs that set artificially low stumpage 
rates for Canadian producers.35 Commerce initiated an 
investigation, but it eventually determined that no subsidy 
existed within the meaning of domestic CVD law and dismissed 
  
 29 BOWMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 554. Other commentators describe the 
dispute as “A War between Friends.” See ZHANG, supra note 4, at 1. 
 30 Canada-U.S. Softwood Lumber Trade Relations (1982–2006), supra note 
11. For the purposes of this note, I address Lumber IV as beginning with the expiration 
of the 1996 Canada-United States Softwood Lumber Agreement, which occurred on 
March 31, 2001. Id. 
 31 Jeffrey L. Dunoff, The Many Dimensions of Softwood Lumber, 45 ALTA. L. 
REV. 319, 320 (2007). 
 32 Other sources provide excellent summaries of the early history of the 
dispute in much greater detail. See, e.g., BOWMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 556-69; 
ZHANG, supra note 4, at 24-165; Kevin C. Kennedy, A Legal History of the Softwood 
Lumber Dispute (in a Nutshell), 52 FOREST SCI. 432, 432-36 (2006). 
 33 See infra Part II. 
 34 U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Initiation of Countervailing Duty Investigations; 
Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, 47 Fed. Reg. 49,878 (Nov. 3, 1982); 
see also supra note 10 (discussing CVD laws).  
 35 Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, 47 Fed. Reg. 49,878.  
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the petition.36 Lumber I is the only round of the softwood 
lumber dispute that did not produce a negotiated settlement.37 
B. Lumber II (1986–1991) 
The peace that Lumber I established was short-lived. In 
1986, the Lumber Coalition filed a second CVD petition, but 
this time Commerce issued an affirmative preliminary 
determination, ruling that Canada’s provincial stumpage 
programs constituted a 15% subsidy.38 Although an affirmative 
preliminary determination is usually followed by a final 
determination, no final determination was reached in Lumber 
II.39 Rather, the investigation was suspended when Canada and 
the United States signed a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) in December 1986, where Canada agreed to impose a 
15% tax on exports of softwood lumber to the United States, 
which Canada could proportionately phase out if the provinces 
increased their stumpage fees.40 Despite this agreement, both 
governments reserved their positions as to whether Canada’s 
stumpage programs qualified as subsidies.41 As a result, the 
conflict at the root of the dispute remained unresolved. 
By 1991, Canada’s major lumber exporting provinces 
had independently increased their stumpage fees and, 
pursuant to the terms of the agreement, Canada eliminated the 
export tax for exports from British Columbia and lowered it to 
3.1% for exports from Quebec.42 Nevertheless, high-level 
Canadian officials remained dissatisfied with the agreement. 
In October 1991, armed with a new dispute settlement 
  
 36 U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Final Negative Countervailing Duty 
Determinations: Certain Softwood Products from Canada, 48 Fed. Reg. 24,159, 24,159 
(May 31, 1983) (finding that the subsidies were “de minimis” and therefore did not 
constitute subsidies within the meaning of section 701 of the Tariff Act of 1930). CVDs 
may only be imposed if the countervailable subsidy is above a de minimis level. 
BOWMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 128. The standard de minimis threshold for CVD 
investigations is 1%. Id.  
 37 David Quayat, The Forest for the Trees: A Roadmap to Canada’s Litigation 
Experience in Lumber IV, 12 J. INT’L ECON. L. 115, 122 (2009). 
 38 U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Preliminary Affirmative Countervailing Duty 
Determination: Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, 51 Fed. Reg. 37,453 
(Oct. 22, 1986). 
 39 BOWMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 134.  
 40 See Statement Regarding the Agreement Between the United States and 
Canada Concerning Trade in Certain Softwood Lumber Products with Memorandum of 
Understanding, Agreed Minute and Related Letters, U.S.-Can., Dec. 30, 1986, Temp. 
State Dep’t No. 87-31, KAV 272, at [i].  
 41 Id. ¶ 3(b).  
 42 BOWMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 560.  
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provision under the Canada-United States Free Trade 
Agreement (CUSFTA)—which permitted review of adverse 
AD/CVD determinations directly to a binational panel43—
Canada terminated the MOU.44 The United States’ reaction was 
both “swift and unprecedented,”45 and Lumber III was launched 
before the end of the month.  
C. Lumber III and the 1996 Softwood Lumber Agreement 
(1991–2001) 
Although Canada’s termination of the MOU should have 
come with little surprise to U.S. officials, Commerce’s swift 
response was indicative of its disappointment with Canada’s 
decision.46 On October 31, 1991, Commerce took the exceptional 
step of self-initiating a CVD investigation for the first time in its 
history.47 Unlike in Lumber II, Commerce eventually reached a 
final affirmative subsidy determination, which was soon 
followed by a final affirmative injury determination by the U.S. 
International Trade Commission (ITC).48 As a result of these 
rulings, Canadian lumber exporters faced an unprecedented 
CVD of 6.51% on all products entering the U.S. market.49 
  
 43 Canada-United States: Free-Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can., ch. 19, Dec. 22, 
1987, 27 I.L.M. 293 (1988). The Canada-United States Free-Trade Agreement 
(CUSFTA) was a predecessor to NAFTA. Quayat, supra note 37, at 123. During the 
negotiations for the CUSFTA, AD/CVD were a source of much controversy. Canada 
wished to see AD/CVD eliminated, and the United States was intent on retaining them. 
Knox, supra note 14, at 434. The result was that the parties were allowed to seek 
review of adverse AD/CVD determinations directly to a binational panel, rather than to 
the domestic court of the country imposing the duties. Id. Despite the fact that this was 
meant only to serve as a temporary solution, NAFTA negotiators included it with only 
“minor modifications.” Id.  
 44 BOWMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 560.  
 45 Quayat, supra note 37, at 123. 
 46 BOWMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 560-61.  
 47 U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Self-Initiation of Countervailing Duty 
Investigation: Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, 56 Fed. Reg. 56,055 
(Oct. 31, 1991); Kennedy, supra note 32, at 434. A CVD investigation is usually 
initiated by an industry petition. See supra note 10.  
 48 U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty 
Determination: Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,570 
(May 28, 1992); Softwood Lumber from Canada, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-414, 731-TA-928, 57 
Fed. Reg. 31389 (July 15, 1992) (final). Under U.S. CVD laws, both a finding of an 
actionable subsidy and a finding of a material injury are required to apply CVDs. See 
supra note 10. 
 49 Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,570. 
Commerce found two types of subsidies—stumpage programs and log export 
regulations—and determined that they resulted in a net subsidy of 6.51% ad valorem. 
Id. at 22,570, 22,580, 22,604. Softwood Lumber I ended when Commerce determined 
that no countervailable subsidy existed. See supra Part I.A. Softwood Lumber II ended 
with the 1986 Memorandum of Understanding. See supra Part I.B. 
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This, however, was only the beginning of Lumber III. The 
defining characteristic of the modern state of the softwood 
lumber dispute is a seemingly endless, often controversial course 
of litigation. And as a sign of things to come, Canada responded 
by exercising its rights under the recently enacted dispute 
settlement mechanisms of the CUSFTA and seeking panel 
review of the United States’ use of trade remedies against its 
exports of softwood lumber.50 Canada appealed both the ITC’s 
injury determination51 and Commerce’s subsidy determination.52 
These appeals were resolved largely in Canada’s favor.  
First, in reviewing the affirmative injury determination, 
the CUSFTA panel rejected the ITC’s finding of material injury 
and remanded the issue for reconsideration.53 Despite the ITC’s 
multiple attempts to address the panel’s concerns on remand, 
the CUSFTA panel continued to rule in Canada’s favor.54 
Similarly, in reviewing Commerce’s affirmative subsidy 
determination, the CUSFTA panel found that a number of 
Commerce’s findings were unsupported by law and remanded 
the issue to Commerce for further consideration.55 After one 
remand, the CUSFTA panel ruled along national lines, with a 
Canadian majority finding that Commerce’s determinations 
were again unsupported by U.S. law and remanding with 
instructions that Commerce make a determination consistent 
with the panel’s finding that no countervailable subsidy existed.56  
  
 50 Chapter 19 is a dispute resolution mechanism that replaces U.S. or 
Canadian judicial review of final AD/CVD determinations with a binational panel. See 
supra note 43. 
 51 United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement Binational Panel Review, In 
the Matter of: Softwood Lumber from Canada, Reviewing the Final Determinations of 
the U.S. International Trade Commission, at 1, USA-92-1904-02 (July 26, 1993) 
[hereinafter Lumber III Injury CUSFTA Panel Decision]. 
 52 United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement Binational Panel Review, In 
the Matter Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, at 1, USA-92-1904-01 
(May 6, 1993) [hereinafter Lumber III Subsidy CUSFTA Panel Decision].  
 53 Lumber III Injury CUSFTA Panel Decision, supra note 51, at 20 
(concluding that “the [U.S. International Trade] Commission’s determination of 
material injury by reason of subsidized Canadian imports is not supported by 
substantial evidence on the record,” and remanding “the Commission’s final 
determination for reconsideration”).  
 54 United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement Binational Panel Review, In 
the Matter of: Softwood Lumber from Canada, at 8, USA-92-1904-02 (July 6, 1994); 
United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement Binational Panel Review, In the Matter 
of: Softwood Lumber from Canada, Decision of the Panel on Review of the Remand 
Determination of the U.S. International Trade Commission, at 35, USA-92-1904-02 
(Jan. 28, 1994). 
 55 Lumber III Subsidy CUSFTA Panel Decision, supra note 52, at 147.  
 56 United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement Binational Panel Review, In 
the Matter of Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, at 7-8, USA-92-1904-01 
(Dec. 17, 1993).  
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Adding to the controversy, the United States appealed 
the panel’s ruling to an Extraordinary Challenge Committee 
(ECC).57 The United States alleged that the panel “exceeded its 
powers, authority and jurisdiction by ignoring the Chapter 19 
standard of review” and that certain members of the panel were 
in “a serious conflict of interest.”58 Ultimately, in another vote 
running along national lines, the ECC dismissed the United 
States’ challenges.59 Despite this ruling, Lumber III continued.  
Although the United States agreed to revoke its CVD 
order, terminate the collection of all duties, and refund 
approximately $800 million that Canadian softwood lumber 
importers had paid,60 Congress responded to the ECC decision by 
amending U.S. trade law in a manner that “effectively 
neutralized” the CUSFTA panel findings on subsidy and injury.61 
Shortly after the passage of these amendments, and 
with the Lumber Coalition poised to file a new CVD petition,62 
the United States and Canada began negotiating an agreement 
to resolve Lumber III. The two countries eventually signed the 
1996 Softwood Lumber Agreement (SLA 1996),63 and in 
exchange for Canada’s commitment to reduce its lumber 
  
 57 Although Chapter 19 decisions are binding and cannot be appealed in 
national courts, the ECC may reverse a panel finding where a member of the panel is 
“guilty of gross misconduct, bias, or serious conflict of interest,” or where a panel 
“seriously departed from a fundamental rule of procedure” or “manifestly exceeded its 
powers.” NAFTA, supra note 18, at art. 1904(13). 
 58 United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement Extraordinary Challenge 
Proceeding, In the Matter of: Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, at 11-
12, ECC-94-1904-01 USA (Aug. 3, 1994) (Opinion of Mr. Justice Gordon L.S. Hart).  
 59 Id. at 33 (Opinion of the Hon. Herbert B. Morgan). Judge Malcolm Wilkey, 
the retired Chief Judge of the D.C. Circuit, dissented and accused the panel of 
substituting its judgment for what U.S. law should be, rather than deferring to what 
U.S. law was, as required by the Chapter 19 standard of review. Id. at 11 (Dissenting 
Opinion of U.S. Circuit Judge (Ret.) Malcolm Wilkey) (“The United States never 
contemplated that United States law would be changed by a binational body. If the 
[Chapter 19] appellate system does not achieve similar results in applying U.S. law, it 
may not be long continued.”). Despite fears of national bias, as of 2006, the Lumber III 
review remained the only instance under Chapter 19 where binational panels have 
split along national lines. Kennedy, supra note 32, at 435. 
 60 Notice of Panel Decision, Revocation of Countervailing Duty Order and 
Termination of Suspension of Liquidation, 59 Fed. Reg. 42,029 (Aug. 16, 1994); Drew 
Fagan & Barrie McKenna, Softwood Duties Coming Home: U.S. to Return About $800-
million to Canadian Exporters, GLOBE & MAIL (Can.), Dec. 3, 1994, at B1. 
 61 Quayat, supra note 37, at 125; see also Kennedy, supra note 32, at 435.  
 62 BOWMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 565. 
 63 Softwood Lumber Agreement, U.S-Can., May 29, 1996, available at 
http://www.international.gc.ca/controls-controles/assets/pdfs/softwood/treaty-e.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 2, 2011) [hereinafter SLA 1996]. 
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exports to the United States through a soft quota,64 the United 
States agreed not to initiate any new trade actions.65 Few 
disputes arose under the SLA 1996,66 but, despite a provision 
for extending the agreement,67 Canada and the United States 
failed to agree to the terms of an extension. Accordingly, the 
agreement expired on March 31, 2001.68  
While the disputes under Lumber I, II, and III are 
telling examples of a “[w]ar between [f]riends,”69 not until 
Lumber IV did it become painstakingly clear that the region’s 
foremost trade agreement, NAFTA, was incapable of providing 
a Softwood Lumber armistice.  
II. THE SOFTWOOD LUMBER “HYDRA”70—LUMBER IV (2001–
2006) 
Canada deployed what has been aptly described as an 
“exhaustive” litigation strategy in Lumber IV.71 Following 
another round of AD/CVD petitions from the Lumber Coalition,72 
a “hydra” of litigation ensued under NAFTA Chapters 11 and 19, 
the WTO dispute settlement system, and U.S. domestic trade 
law.73 These challenges, which are addressed below,74 created a 
chaotic overlap between dispute settlement processes that 
ultimately pushed the parties toward a negotiated settlement in 
the form of the SLA 2006. Although this agreement 
  
 64 Canada was entitled to ship 14.7 billion board feet of lumber duty free 
annually. Amounts shipped in excess of the amount were subject to a series of 
escalating export taxes. Id. at art. II(2). 
 65 Id. at art. I.  
 66 Sarah E. Lysons, Comment, Resolving the Softwood Lumber Dispute, 32 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 407, 421 (2009). 
 67 SLA 1996, supra note 63, at art. X. 
 68 BOWMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 569.  
 69 ZHANG, supra note 4, at 1. 
 70 Knox, supra note 14, at 436. 
 71 Quayat, supra note 37, at 126. 
 72 In a move that demonstrates why parties directly involved in the 
Canadian-American softwood lumber trade should welcome the extension of the SLA 
2006, it took all of one business day after the expiration of the SLA 1996 for the 
Lumber Coalition to file fresh AD/CVD petitions. BOWMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 569.  
 73 Knox, supra note 14, at 436.  
 74 The futility of overlapping dispute-settlement mechanisms is best 
highlighted through a focus on the concurrent litigation that occurred under NAFTA 
and the WTO with regards to the United States’ determination that Canada had 
subsidized its lumber industry. See, e.g., Sydney M. Cone III, Canadian Softwood 
Lumber and “Free Trade” Under NAFTA, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 840 (2006-2007). 
These forums, therefore, are discussed first and in the greatest detail. The subsequent 
discussions regarding dumping determinations, NAFTA Chapter 11, and disputes 
within the U.S. domestic legal system serve to underscore the convoluted nature of the 
multilateral trading system’s various dispute settlement mechanisms. 
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acknowledges the systemic shortcomings of PTAs and the 
overlapping dispute settlement mechanisms they create, the SLA 
2006’s failure to address these issues head on does more to add to 
the forces undercutting multilateralism than it does to resolve 
the issues that created the need for an agreement. 
A. Are Two Heads Better than One?—Canada’s Challenges to 
the United States’ Subsidy Determinations Under NAFTA 
Chapter 19 and the WTO Dispute Settlement System 
Following the Lumber Coalition’s newest AD/CVD 
petitions, Commerce and the ITC made final affirmative 
determinations that Canada was subsidizing its softwood lumber 
industry75 and that the subsidized Canadian softwood lumber 
imports presented a threat of material injury to the U.S. lumber 
industry.76 Canada sought review of these determinations under 
both Chapter 19 of NAFTA and the WTO dispute settlement 
mechanisms.77 Although Canada was largely successful in its 
appeals, the “two uncoordinated avenues for resolving disputes” 
failed—perhaps unsurprisingly—to reach uniform resolutions 
and allowed the parties to engage in “litigious gamesmanship” 
that prolonged an already protracted dispute.78 
1. Canada’s Success Under NAFTA 
a. NAFTA’s Review of Commerce’s Affirmative Subsidy 
Determination 
Canada was successful in its NAFTA challenge to 
Commerce’s final affirmative subsidy determination. The NAFTA 
panel reviewing the determination found that while Canada’s 
  
 75 U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Notice of Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty 
Determination and Final Negative Critical Circumstances Determination: Certain 
Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, 67 Fed. Reg. 15,545 (Apr. 2, 2002); U.S. Dep’t 
of Commerce, Notice of Final Determination of Sales at Less than Fair Value: Certain 
Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, 67 Fed. Reg. 15,539 (Apr. 2, 2002).  
 76 Softwood Lumber from Canada, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-414, 731-TA-928, 67 Fed. 
Reg. 36,022 (May 22, 2002) (final). 
 77 North American Free Trade Agreement Binational Panel Review, In the 
Matter of Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, Final Affirmative Countervailing 
Duty Determination, at 5, USA-CDA-2002-1904-03 (Aug. 13, 2003) [hereinafter Lumber 
IV Subsidy NAFTA Panel Decision]; Panel Report, United States—Final 
Countervailing Duty Determination with Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from 
Canada, ¶ 1.1, WT/DS257/R (Aug. 29, 2003) [hereinafter Lumber IV Subsidy WTO 
Panel Report]. 
 78 Cone, supra note 74, at 850. 
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stumpage program constituted a financial contribution,79 the 
evidence Commerce relied on did not reveal the existence of a 
benefit. Accordingly, the panel ruled that the imports had not 
received an actionable subsidy.80 What resulted was a game of 
“ping-pong” between Commerce and the panel, where the panel 
would remand the determination, and Commerce would revise 
its methodology.81 The result of each revised subsidy 
determination was a reduction in the CVD rate, and by the time 
Commerce issued its fifth subsidy finding, it had determined 
that the benefit given to Canadian producers was de minimis in 
nature.82 Essentially, Commerce was forced to reluctantly accept 
the panel’s determination that Canada’s provisional stumpage 
programs did not confer a benefit on softwood lumber producers, 
and thus that no actionable subsidy existed.  
b. NAFTA’s Review of the ITC’s Affirmative Injury 
Determination 
Canada was also largely successful in its challenge to the 
ITC’s affirmative threat of injury determination. According to a 
NAFTA panel, there was insufficient evidence to support the 
ITC’s finding.83 Following this decision, another series of 
remands ensued. This time, however, the panel “lost patience 
with the game [of ping-pong],”84 refused to remand for further re-
evaluation, and ordered the ITC to enter a finding of no material 
injury.85 From NAFTA’s perspective, a U.S. agency had, again, 
improperly applied its domestic trade laws and improperly 
subjected Canadian imports of softwood lumber to CVDs.  
  
 79 Lumber IV Subsidy NAFTA Panel Decision, supra note 77, at 20. Under 
U.S. trade law, for a subsidy to be actionable via the imposition of countervailable 
duties, it must result in both a financial contribution and a benefit to the recipients of 
the subsidy. Id. at 17.  
 80 Id. at 35.  
 81 Knox, supra note 14, at 437. 
 82 North American Free Trade Agreement Binational Panel Review, In the 
Matter of Softwood Lumber from Canada, Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty 
Determination, at 4, USA-CDA-2002-1904-03 (Mar. 17, 2006). 
 83 North American Free Trade Agreement Binational Panel Review, In the 
Matter of Softwood Lumber from Canada: Final Affirmative Threat of Material Injury 
Determination, at 107, USA-CDA-2002-1904-07 (Sept. 5, 2003). 
 84 Knox, supra note 14, at 437. 
 85 North American Free Trade Agreement Binational Panel Review, In the 
Matter of Softwood Lumber from Canada: Final Affirmative Threat of Injury 
Determination, at 7, USA-CDA-2002-1904-07 (Aug. 31, 2004). The panel noted that, 
“The Commission has made it abundantly clear . . . that it is simply unwilling to accept 
this Panel’s review authority under Chapter 19 of the NAFTA and has consistently 
ignored the authority of this Panel in an effort to preserve its finding of threat of 
material injury.” Id. at 3. 
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The United States launched an Extraordinary 
Challenge to both of the NAFTA panel rulings, but the ECC 
upheld the panel’s injury ruling86 and, prior to its decision on 
the panel’s subsidy finding, the two parties agreed to the terms 
of the 2006 SLA, which ended the challenge.87  
Although Canada emerged victorious in the NAFTA 
rulings, simply cutting off one of the hydra’s heads does not slay 
the beast. Indeed, Canada’s challenges to the United States’ 
subsidy determinations also took place under the WTO dispute 
settlement process. Unfortunately, with no clear roadmap in 
place to outline the legal relationship between NAFTA and WTO 
dispute settlement systems,88 the WTO proceedings ran the risk 
of being, at best, tedious and, at worst, contradictory.  
2. Mixed Results at the WTO 
a. The WTO’s Review of Commerce’s Affirmative 
Subsidy Determination 
Canada’s WTO arguments regarding Commerce’s 
affirmative subsidy determination “mirrored” its arguments 
before the NAFTA Chapter 19 panel.89 Similar to the NAFTA 
panel, both a WTO Panel and the Appellate Body (AB) agreed 
with the United States that the Canadian stumpage programs 
constituted a financial contribution under WTO subsidy law.90 
Yet while NAFTA ruled decisively that the subsidy did not 
benefit Canadian producers—making it non-actionable—the 
WTO ruling on this issue is less clear. 
Although the WTO Panel sided with Canada and ruled 
that the United States used an improper methodology to 
  
 86 North American Free Trade Agreement Binational Panel Review, In the 
Matter of Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, Opinion and Order of the 
Extraordinary Challenge Committee, at 2, ECC-2004-1904-01USA (Aug. 10, 2005). 
Notably, the panel held that “in rare circumstances,” a Panel may remand to the 
Commission with instructions to enter a decision that the evidence on the record does 
not support a threat of material injury. Id. at 15. 
 87 Notice of Suspension of Extraordinary Challenge Committee, 71 Fed. Reg. 
28,854 (May 18, 2006). 
 88 See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text. In addition to there being no 
overarching statute that defines the relation between PTA and WTO tribunals, domestic 
law concepts such as res judicata, lis pendens, and forum non conveniens, which address 
overlapping authority, do not apply in the NAFTA/WTO context where the two panels are, 
strictly speaking, applying different law. Pauwelyn & Salles, supra note 19, at 102-13. 
 89 Quayat, supra note 37, at 135.  
 90 Appellate Body Report, United States—Final Countervailing Duty 
Determination with Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, ¶ 76, 
WT/DS257/AB/R (Jan. 19, 2004) [hereinafter Lumber IV Subsidy WTO AB Report]. 
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determine that Canada’s stumpage programs resulted in a 
benefit, the AB reversed this ruling.91 Nevertheless, this 
reversal focused on the WTO Panel’s flawed reasoning, leaving 
open the question of whether a benefit existed.92 Indeed, due to 
an “insufficient factual basis to complete the legal analysis,” 
the AB was unable to definitively determine whether Canada’s 
financial contribution had produced a benefit and thus was 
unable to determine whether both elements for an actionable 
subsidy existed.93 An issue that a NAFTA panel determined 
decisively was therefore left unresolved at the WTO. 
For the United States to successfully defend its 
affirmative subsidy determination at the WTO, Commerce also 
needed to show that the alleged subsidies to timber harvesters 
“pass[ed]-through” to the producers of the softwood lumber 
imported into the United States.94 Following several WTO Panel 
and AB reports,95 the AB eventually found against Commerce on 
this point, ruling that Commerce had conducted a defective 
pass-through analysis and had failed to comply with its WTO 
obligations.96 This marked yet another victory for Canada. 
b. The WTO’s Review of the ITC’s Affirmative Injury 
Determination 
Canada’s challenge to the ITC’s injury determination 
before the WTO was again similar to its challenges brought 
under NAFTA. Canada attempted to persuade the WTO that 
the ITC’s affirmative threat of injury finding was not supported 
by proper evidence.97 A WTO Panel sided with Canada, ruling 
that an “objective and unbiased decision maker” could not have 
properly found a threat of injury based upon the evidence 
presented to the ITC.98 But, the Panel denied Canada’s requests 
  
 91 Id. ¶ 119. 
 92 Id. ¶ 122. 
 93 Id.  
 94 Cone, supra note 74, at 847. 
 95 These included: (i) an August 19, 2003 Panel Report, (ii) a January 19, 2004 
Appellate Body Report, and (iii) an August 1, 2005 Panel Report. Id. at 848. 
 96 Appellate Body Report, United States—Final Countervailing Duty 
Determination with Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, ¶ 96, 
WT/DS257/AB/RW (Dec. 5, 2005). The AB upheld the panel’s findings that Article 10 of 
the SCM Agreement and Article VI:3 of the GATT 1994 require a pass-through analysis 
in circumstances in which a subsidy is received by a harvester, and CVDs are then 
attached to the imports from an unrelated producer. Id. 
 97 Panel Report, United States—Investigation of the International Trade 
Commission in Softwood Lumber from Canada, WT/DS277/R, ¶¶ 4.2-4.62 (Mar. 22, 2004). 
 98 Id. ¶ 7.89. 
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to recommend that the United States revoke its final 
determination of threat of injury, stop the application of duties, 
and return the cash deposits already collected.99 Neither the 
United States nor Canada appealed the Panel’s decision, but 
the U.S. response to the ruling gave rise to one of the most 
controversial events of Lumber IV.100 This suspect response 
underscored both the lengths the United States was willing to 
go to protect its softwood lumber industry and the 
opportunities for manipulation available within overlapping 
dispute settlement forums.101  
3. The United States Uses a WTO Defeat to Mitigate 
Adverse NAFTA Rulings 
After the WTO Panel’s ruling that no threat of injury 
existed, the ITC undertook a new injury determination and 
again concluded that a substantial increase of Canadian 
softwood lumber imports presented a threat of material injury 
to the U.S. industry.102 From the United States’ perspective, this 
“new” affirmative injury finding meant that earlier rulings by 
multiple NAFTA panels—finding the ITC’s injury 
determination to be unsubstantiated by the evidence—were 
now moot because the ITC had made, and Commerce had 
adopted, a new finding.103 Put differently, the United States 
attempted to “use[] a WTO defeat to justify ignoring several 
adverse NAFTA Panel findings.”104 
Canada challenged the ITC’s new threat of injury 
finding at the WTO, but its legitimacy was never definitively 
ascertained. First, a WTO Panel ruled that the ITC had cured 
the defects identified in the original WTO ruling, which in 
  
 99 Id. ¶¶ 8.7-8.8.  
 100 Quayat, supra note 37, at 134.  
 101 BOWMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 581.  
 102 U.S. Trade Rep., WTO Dispute Settlement Proceeding Regarding 
Investigation of the International Trade Commission in Softwood Lumber from 
Canada, 70 Fed. Reg. 36,687 (June 24, 2005). Under U.S. law, WTO rulings do not 
automatically bind the Executive. Rather, Section 129 of the Uruguay Round 
Amendments Act allows the U.S. Trade Representative to request that the ITC “issue a 
determination in connection with the particular proceeding that would render the 
Commission’s action . . . not inconsistent with the findings of the panel or Appellate 
Body.” 19 U.S.C § 3538(a)(4) (2006). 
 103 U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Amendment to Antidumping and Countervailing 
Duty Orders on Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, 69 Fed. Reg. 75,916, 
75,917 (Dec. 20, 2004); Quayat, supra note 37, at 134. 
 104 BOWMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 581.  
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essence affirmed the ITC’s new injury determination.105 The AB, 
however, set aside this ruling, finding that the Panel had 
applied an improper standard of review and had failed to 
perform a complete analysis.106 But the AB did not complete the 
analysis itself.107 The AB reasoned that “completing the 
analysis . . . would require us to review extensive aspects of the 
[ITC]’s threat of injury and causation analyses, and would 
require us to engage in a comprehensive examination of highly 
complex and contested facts.”108 In the end, the AB was “unable 
to make a recommendation to the Dispute Settlement Body,” 
and the validity of the ITC’s “new” injury determination was 
never definitively settled under WTO law.109  
Although U.S. attempts to nullify the adverse NAFTA 
rulings were deemed improper once the issue reached the 
United States Court of International Trade (CIT),110 the 
discordant overlap between NAFTA’s and the WTO’s dispute 
settlement mechanisms allowed the United States to—at least 
temporarily—disregard a PTA dispute settlement panel’s 
rulings under the guise of complying with the rules of the 
multilateral trading system. Among the dangers associated with 
incongruous legal forums, this is perhaps the most alarming.  
B. New Allegations—Dumping Claims Under NAFTA 
Chapter 19 and the WTO  
In addition to allegations of illegal subsidies, Lumber IV 
also included, for the first time, a dumping claim against 
Canadian lumber producers.111 This claim ultimately turned on 
  
 105 Reversing its earlier finding, the Panel was unable to “conclude that an 
objective and unbiased investigation authority could not find that [the evidence] 
supported the conclusion reached by the USITC.” Panel Report, United States—
Investigation of the International Trade Commission in Softwood Lumber from Canada, 
Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Canada, ¶ 7.39, WT/DS277/RW (Nov. 15, 2005). 
 106 Appellate Body Report, United States—Investigation of the International 
Trade Commission in Softwood Lumber from Canada, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the 
DSU by Canada, ¶ 138, WT/DS277/AB/RW (Apr. 13, 2006) [hereinafter Lumber IV 
Injury WTO AB Report]. 
 107 The AB only has the authority to “uphold, modify, or reverse the findings” 
of a WTO Panel. There is no provision at the WTO for remand with instructions. “This 
means that the legal issue involved can be resolved only if the [AB] completes the 
analysis itself.” DANIEL C.K. CHOW & THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
LAW: PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS 54 (2008). 
 108 Lumber IV Injury WTO AB Report, supra note 105, ¶ 160. 
 109 Id. ¶ 163. 
 110 See infra Part II.D. 
 111 BOWMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 569. Dumping occurs under U.S. law when 
a foreign producer sells an export in the United States at a price lower than its home 
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the United States’ use of a controversial practice known as 
“zeroing,” which often results in higher margins with respect to 
dumping calculations.112 As with Canada’s challenges to the 
United States’ subsidy determinations, Canada appealed to two 
independent dispute settlement bodies in order to resolve a 
single claim. After the AB upheld a WTO Panel ruling that sided 
with Canada and found that the United States’ use of zeroing 
was a violation of the WTO’s Antidumping Agreement,113 a 
NAFTA Chapter 19 Panel essentially incorporated the WTO’s 
decision and directed Commerce to make a determination on 
dumping without using the zeroing technique.114 While the two 
dumping rulings were consistent with one another, the 
duplicative litigation again highlights the inefficiency that 
plagued Lumber IV.115 
C. Investor-State Claims Under NAFTA Chapter 11 
Adding to the “[s]paghetti bowl of WTO and NAFTA 
proceedings,”116 Lumber IV also included claims under NAFTA 
  
market price. See 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (2006). Dumping investigations are conducted much 
in the same way as subsidy investigations. See supra note 10. 
 112 When zeroing is applied,  
the analysis treats the margins for transactions made at [less than fair value] 
(dumped) in accordance with the actual amounts (positive numbers), while 
transactions with dumping margins of less than zero (that is, made at more 
than fair value) are treated as zero rather than as negative numbers. Under 
such circumstances, higher non-dumped export prices do not offset the lower 
dumped export prices. 
BOWMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 574. This has the potential to inflate the margins of 
dumping. Id. 
 113 Appellate Body Report, United States—Final Dumping Determination on 
Softwood Lumber from Canada, ¶ 117, WT/DS264/AB/R (Aug. 11, 2004). 
 114 North American Free Trade Agreement Binational Panel Review, In the 
Matter of Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada: Final Affirmative 
Antidumping Determination, at 2, USA-CDA-2002-1904-02 (June 9, 2005). 
 115 See, e.g., Lysons, supra note 66, at 423-24 (arguing that Canada’s litigation 
strategy in Lumber IV “increased costs to both Canadian and American taxpayers” and 
added to “the political tensions between the two countries . . . [making] settlement 
negotiations difficult”). The Canadian federal government spent an estimated $13 
million on softwood legal fees from 2005 to 2006 alone. Sources indicate that when one 
combines the spending of the Canadian federal government, the provinces, individual 
forest companies, and forest lobby groups, the figure rises to more than $300 million 
over the course of Lumber IV. Sylvain Larocque, Legal Tab in Lumber Battle May Hit 
$300M, TORONTO STAR, Oct. 30, 2006, at A3, available at http://www.thestar.com/ 
news/canada/article/113100--legal-tab-in-lumber-battle-may-hit-300m.  
 116 Joost Pauwelyn, Adding Sweeteners to Softwood Lumber: The WTO-
NAFTA ‘Spaghetti Bowl’ Is Cooking, 9 J. INT’L ECON. L. 197 (2006). The term “spaghetti 
bowl,” when discussing international trade, has been attributed to Professor Jagdish 
Bhagwati and is meant to describe the chaotic scene that results from multiple trade 
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Chapter 11.117 Three Canadian lumber producers initiated 
separate arbitration proceedings against the United States,118 
alleging that its conduct in investigating and imposing of AD 
and CVD orders had violated their rights to national 
treatment,119 most-favored-nation treatment,120 and the 
minimum standard of treatment guaranteed under customary 
international law.121 In the end, the arbitral tribunal found that 
Chapter 11 does not encompass claims where the allegations 
confront the administration of trade remedy laws.122 In other 
words, the parties could not use Chapter 11 as an end run 
around Chapter 19.123  
Although this ruling prevented yet another decision on 
the legitimacy of the United States’ use of its trade laws, the 
simple initiation of arbitration proceedings during Lumber IV 
is another example of the seemingly endless cycle of litigation 
that the participants faced. It was not until after the dispute 
reached U.S. courts that a final disposition was achieved. To 
the chagrin of many, however, this finality would not come by 
  
agreements crisscrossing one another like spaghetti noodles. See, e.g., BHAGWATI, supra 
note 1, at 61. Lumber IV is a prime example of this confusion. 
 117 NAFTA Chapter 11 deals with investor-state arbitrations and contains 
provisions designed to protect cross-border investors and facilitate the settlement of 
investment disputes. NAFTA, supra note 18, at art. 1101-138.  
 118 Tembec, Inc. v. United States, Notice of Arbitration and Statement of 
Arbitration Claim (NAFTA 2004), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/ 
organization/27805.pdf; Terminal Forest Prods. Ltd. v. United States, Notice of Arbitration 
(NAFTA 2003), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/31360.pdf; 
Canfor v. United States, Notice of Arbitration and Statement of Claim (NAFTA 2002), 
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/13203.pdf. 
 119 “Each Party shall accord to investors [and investments of investors] of 
another Party treatment no less favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances, 
to its own investors [and investments of its own investors] . . . .” NAFTA, supra note 18, 
at art. 1102(1)-(2). 
 120 “Each Party shall accord to investors [and investments of investors] of 
another Party treatment no less favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances, 
to investors [investments of investors] of any other Party or of a non-Party . . . .” Id. at 
art. 1103(1)-(2). 
 121 “Each Party shall accord to investments of investors of another Party 
treatment in accordance with international law, including fair and equitable treatment 
and full protection and security.” Id. at art. 1105(1). 
 122 Canfor v. United States; Terminal Forest Prods. Ltd. v. United States, 
Decision on Preliminary Question, ¶ 273 (NAFTA 2006), available at http://www.state.gov/ 
documents/organization/67753.pdf [hereinafter Canfor Arbitration Decision].  
 123 See Quayat, supra note 37, at 132-33. The SLA 2006 resulted in the 
withdrawal of all claims under NAFTA Chapter 11. See SLA 2006, supra note 2, at art. 
XI(2) (“The operation and application of Section B of Chapter Eleven of the NAFTA is 
hereby suspended with respect to any matter arising under the SLA 2006 and any 
measure taken by a Party that is necessary to give effect to or implement the SLA 
2006. Consequently, no claim under Section B of Chapter Eleven of the NAFTA may be 
made against a Party by investors of the United States or Canada in respect of any 
such matter or measure.”). 
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way of judicial disposition, but rather through a negotiated 
settlement—calling into question the purpose of the previous 
five years’ battles.124  
D. The End of Litigation—Claims Under United States 
Law 
By the time the parties agreed to the “Basic Terms” of 
the SLA, the softwood lumber saga had entered a third arena: 
the CIT. Litigation involving a single trade dispute was now 
pending in three separate forums. But with Canada poised to 
claim victory, a deal was struck, and the SLA 2006 brought an 
end to litigation before the effects of the CIT’s rulings were 
realized.125 Nevertheless, it is important to briefly address the 
two principal issues that were raised before the CIT, adding to 
the complexity of Lumber IV.  
First, several interested Canadian private and 
governmental parties brought suit to have the so-called “Byrd 
Amendment” struck down.126 The amendment called for the 
distribution of AD/CVD duties directly to members of an 
industry that successfully obtained protection under U.S. trade 
law.127 This essentially created a financial incentive for 
companies to file trade remedy petitions.128 The CIT sided with 
Canada and halted future distributions under the Byrd 
Amendment for actions brought against NAFTA parties.129 The 
United States eventually repealed the amendment, which 
made it clear to the Lumber Coalition that further litigation 
would not result in the direct delivery of any money to the U.S. 
lumber industry.130  
Second, another group of Canadian private and 
governmental parties sought to challenge what they 
characterized as an unlawful exercise of statutory authority by 
  
 124 See, e.g., Eliot J. Feldman, Deal or No Deal: Snatching Defeat from the 
Jaws of Victory, 13 INT’L TRADE L. & REG. 91, 95 (2007) (arguing that “instead of 
winning free trade through legal proceedings, including a confirmation that Canadian 
provincial governments do not subsidise softwood lumber production or exports, 
Canada accepted draconian managed trade for potentially nine years”).  
 125 See infra Part III. 
 126 Can. Lumber Trade Alliance v. United States, 517 F.3d 1319, 1333-34 (Ct. 
Int’l Trade 2008). 
 127 19 U.S.C. § 1675c (repealed 2006).  
 128 Quayat, supra note 37, at 138. 
 129 Can. Lumber Trade Alliance, 517 F.3d at 1344 (affirming a 2006 CIT 
declaratory judgment that the Byrd Amendment did “not apply to antidumping and 
countervailing duties assessed on imports of goods from Canada or Mexico”). 
 130 Feldman, supra note 124, at 91.  
2012] SOFTWOOD LUMBER’S “TERMITE” PROBLEM 185 
 
the United States in its attempts to evade NAFTA panel 
rulings under the guise of implementing a WTO panel 
decision.131 A three-judge CIT panel, headed by the Chief 
Justice, ruled that Section 129—the tool that the United States 
used in its attempt to moot the NAFTA Panels’ adverse rulings 
on the ITC’s threat of injury findings—did not permit the 
substitution of a new injury determination to support existing 
duty orders.132 Consequently, the court validated the original 
NAFTA rulings, which held that the United States’ CVD/AD 
orders were improper, and it found that NAFTA panel review 
had the same legal effect as review in a U.S. court.133 The 
United States was, therefore, without a legal basis for 
maintaining its CVD/AD orders, and the Canadian parties 
were “entitled to a full refund of the deposits collected on 
softwood lumber.”134 The United States had, in effect, 
improperly collected over $5 billion worth of deposits.135 
Over the course of Lumber IV, a disagreement over the 
lawfulness of differing forest management systems produced 
nearly thirty international and domestic decisions.136 The 
discordant dispute settlement mechanisms gave Canada 
multiple “bites at the apple” and permitted both superfluous 
and disingenuous litigation.137 Nevertheless, it finally appeared 
that the CIT’s decisions would allow Canada to claim a definite 
victory. Yet with this end in sight,138 it was the negotiating table, 
not the courtroom, that finally brought Lumber IV to a close.  
  
 131 See supra Part II.A.3; see also Tembec, Inc. v. United States, 441 F. Supp. 
2d 1302, 1306 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2006) (“[Plaintiffs] allege that the United States has 
illegally continued to enforce antidumping (‘AD’) and countervailing duty (‘CVD’) 
orders following the illegal implementation of an affirmative injury determination 
issued by the ITC pursuant to section 129 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act 
(‘URAA’).”).  
 132 Tembec, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 1336 (“Because section 129 only applies where 
the United States has lost before the WTO, Congress expected that adoption of WTO 
recommendations with respect to an ITC determination would result in determinations 
revoking all or part of an existing order, if implementation were necessary at all.” 
(emphasis added)). 
 133 Tembec, Inc. v. United States, 461 F. Supp. 2d 1355, 1364 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2006). 
 134 Quayat, supra note 37, at 143; see also Tembec, 461 F. Supp. 2d at 1367 
(“The legislative history makes it clear that Congress did not set up a system to retain 
duties that are not owed.”). 
 135 BOWMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 553.  
 136 See Quayat, supra note 37, at 116. Quayat counts twenty-six NAFTA 
(including panel and appellate body) and WTO decisions. Combined with the various 
decisions of the CIT, this number rises to nearly thirty.  
 137 Lysons, supra note 66 at 423. 
 138 The Canadian government appears to disagree with this proposition. 
Canada pressed its softwood lumber industry to accept the SLA 2006 by arguing the 
opposite: that litigation would never end. Feldman, supra note 124, at 95. 
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III. “SNATCHING DEFEAT FROM THE JAWS OF VICTORY”139—
THE TERMS OF THE 2006 SOFTWOOD LUMBER 
AGREEMENT 
On September 12, 2006, despite, or perhaps as a result 
of,140 Canada’s legal victories during Lumber IV, Canadian and 
American authorities signed the SLA 2006—a negotiated 
settlement that ended the most recent and heavily litigated 
round of the softwood lumber dispute.141 The impacts of the 
agreement were twofold. First, it brought stability and clarity 
to the dispute settlement process—much to the delight of those 
involved in the Canadian-American softwood lumber trade. 
And second, it removed much of the parties’ incentive to 
address NAFTA’s shortcomings head on—which should raise 
concerns for those who are committed to strengthening the 
multilateral trading system. But before addressing the 
conflicting impacts of the agreement and its subsequent 
extension, it is important to first understand what the parties 
actually agreed to. 
A. The United States Retains Its Spoils—The Issue of Duty 
Deposits 
Despite the CIT’s determination that Canada was 
entitled to a full refund of the deposits collected on softwood 
lumber,142 the SLA 2006 failed to deliver such a result.143 Under 
the terms of the agreement, the United States agreed to revoke 
its AD/CVD orders and refund approximately $4.5 billion144 in 
deposits it collected since 2002.145 The United States, therefore, 
was permitted to retain $1 billion of illegally collected duties.146 
This included $500 million to the members of the Lumber 
Coalition, which some viewed as “a reward for 
  
 139 Id. at 91. 
 140 See Quayat, supra note 37, at 144-46 (arguing that rather than using 
“litigation as a path to victory,” Canada used “litigation as a negotiating tool,” and 
“secured a sufficiently broad range of legal victories to create a significant incentive for 
the [United States] to find a negotiated settlement”). 
 141 SLA 2006, supra note 2; Quayat, supra note 37, at 116. 
 142 See supra Part II.D. 
 143 SLA 2006, supra note 2, at art. III-IV. 
 144 Softwood Lumber: Canada-U.S. Softwood Lumber Agreement—
Backgrounder, FOREIGN AFFAIRS & INT’L TRADE CAN., http://www.international.gc.ca/ 
controls-controles/softwood-bois_oeuvre/notices-avis/agreement-accord.aspx?lang=eng&view=d 
(last modified Feb. 13, 2012).  
 145 SLA 2006, supra note 2, at art. III-IV. 
 146 Id. at Annex 2C(5). 
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sponsoring . . . illegal trade actions” and a “nest egg that will 
finance future trade harassment,”147 and $450 million for a 
“meritorious initiatives” account, which was viewed as “a gift” to 
the U.S. government.148 Needless to say, this outcome was deeply 
problematic for opponents of the settlement.149  
B. Canada Agrees to Less than Free-Trade—The Issue of 
Export Measures 
The SLA 2006 has also been criticized for codifying 
protectionist trade remedies.150 Under the agreement, various 
regions in Canada are subject to a three-tier tariff or a tariff-
rated quota system.151 When lumber prices are below $315 per 
unit, Canadian lumber exporters pay either: (a) a 15% export 
tax, or (b) a 5% tax accompanied by a volume restraint on 
exports.152 As the price of lumber increases, export charges 
decline and export quotas increase.153 Only when lumber prices 
go over $355 per unit is lumber imported without export 
charges or volume restraints.154 As those opposed to extending 
the agreement point out, “the price [of lumber] has risen above 
the $355 threshold only once” since 2006, meaning that the 
  
 147 Softwood Lumber Deal: Hearing Before the Standing Comm. on Int’l Trade, 
39th Parliament 1st Sess. at 5 (2006) (statement of Mr. Normand Rivard, Council 
Chair, United Steelworkers), available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/content/hoc/ 
Committee/391/CIIT/Evidence/EV2326139/CIITEV23-E.PDF [hereinafter Canadian 
Parliament Softwood Lumber Hearing].  
 148 Id. at 2 (statement of Dr. Elliot Feldman, Trade Lawyer, Baker & 
Hostetler LLP); see also SLA 2006, supra note 2, at Annex 2C(5).  
 149 See Feldman, supra note 124, at 94 (arguing that “had litigation continued 
on its course without extra-legal interference from the two sovereign governments . . . , 
Canadian industry would have received back all of its money and the [U.S.] industry 
would have received none”). Eventually, however, Mr. Feldman (or at least the clients 
he represents) came to support extending the SLA 2006. That support was based on the 
fact that “Canada’s softwood lumber industry paid a very significant initiation fee for 
the SLA, $1 billion,” and “in light of its prior payment and sacrifice, now looks to 
whatever continuing benefits may be derived from the SLA according to its already 
agreed terms.” Letter from Elliot J. Feldman, Baker & Hostetler LLP, on behalf of the 
Ontario Forest Indus. Assoc. and the Conseil de l’Industrie Forestière du Québec, to 
Mary Sullivan Smith, Dir. for Can. Affairs, Office of the U.S. Trade Rep. (Oct. 6, 2011), 
available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=USTR-2011-0011-0002 
(follow “View Attachment: PDF” hyperlink). 
 150 Soft in Wood and Head U.S.-Canadian Lumber Deal Makes a Mockery of 
Free Trade, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2006, at 6 [hereinafter Soft in Wood and Head] 
(arguing that “[i]f private companies were to attempt, on their own, to strike this kind 
of anti-competitive deal, they would be rightly hauled before [U.S.] and Canadian 
authorities. Yet the latter can call it managed trade, and get away with it.”).  
 151 SLA 2006, supra note 2, at art. VII. 
 152 Id. 
 153 Id. 
 154 Id. 
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vast majority of softwood lumber imported from Canada has 
arrived subject to trade restrictive duties and volume 
restraints.155 This fact gives credence to those who argue that 
the agreement is one that would make the “Comecon officials of 
the Soviet era look like relative Friedmanites.”156 
C. Slaying the Softwood Hydra—The Issue of Dispute 
Settlement Mechanisms 
The proliferation of PTAs and the lack of legal certainty 
governing their relationship with WTO dispute settlement 
mechanisms have negatively affected the softwood lumber 
dispute by providing the parties with a near endless recourse to 
dissonant legal forums. The SLA 2006 mitigates this problem 
by streamlining the dispute settlement process.157  
If the parties fail to “arrive at a satisfactory resolution 
of the matter” through consultations, the agreement authorizes 
the parties to arbitrate the matter in the London Court of 
International Arbitration (LCIA).158 Moreover, the SLA 2006 
specifically protects against the potential for overlapping 
adjudication. For the duration of the agreement, “neither Party 
shall initiate any litigation or dispute settlement proceedings 
with respect to any matter arising under the SLA 2006, 
including proceedings pursuant to the Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization or Chapter Twenty 
of the NAFTA.”159 Additionally, the United States is not 
permitted to “self-initiate” any AD or CVD investigations for 
the duration of the agreement, and private parties involved in 
various lawsuits were forced to consent in writing to terminate 
all outstanding NAFTA and domestic legal proceedings.160 
These provisions limit adjudication of the softwood lumber 
  
 155 Letter from Gerald M. Howard, Pres. & CEO, Nat’l Ass’n of Home 
Builders, to Mary Sullivan Smith, Dir. for Can. Affairs, Office of the U.S. Trade Rep. 
(Oct. 14, 2011), available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=USTR-
2011-0011-0003 (follow “View Attachment: PDF” hyperlink) [hereinafter Howard, 
USTR Comment] (labeling homebuilders, remodelers, and homebuyers as “downstream 
consumers”). 
 156 Soft in Wood and Head, supra note 150, at 6. 
 157 SLA 2006, supra note 2, at art. XIV. 
 158 Id. at art. XIV(4)-(6). This procedure is “unusual” in that the LCIA is 
known as a nongovernmental commercial arbitration institution that typically 
administers matters between private parties as opposed to sovereign governments. 
John R. Crook, United States and Canada Arbitrate a Softwood Lumber Dispute in the 
London Court of International Arbitration, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 192, 192 (2008). 
 159 SLA 2006, supra note 2, at art. XIV(2). 
 160 Id. at art. V & Annex 2A. 
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dispute to a single forum, the LCIA, effectively “slay[ing] the 
softwood lumber hydra.”161  
D. Agree to Disagree—Disputes Under the SLA 2006 
Despite successfully addressing one of the major 
problems facing Lumber IV, the SLA 2006 was not designed to 
resolve the underlying legal issues of the dispute. The positions 
of both parties—with regard to the validity of the United 
States’ AD/CVD orders and the legal effect of courts’ or other 
dispute settlement bodies’ decisions regarding those orders—
were explicitly reserved.162 Therefore, it is not surprising that 
limiting the forums in which disputes can arise has not ended 
all conflict with regard to the softwood lumber dispute.  
To date, the United States has filed three separate 
Requests for Arbitration under the SLA 2006, and decisions in 
each case indicate that the LCIA is an effective tribunal.163 The 
first request by the United States protested Canada’s alleged 
failure to properly calculate export quotas during the first six 
months of 2007.164 The tribunal largely sided with the United 
States, ruling that Canada had failed to properly calculate 
quotas on exports from certain regions and consequently 
ordering Canada to impose an additional 10% charge on 
exports from those regions.165  
Separately, another tribunal was formed in response to 
the United States’ request to consider whether certain 
provincial assistance programs—which Quebec and Ontario 
put into place to aid Canadian softwood lumber producers and 
exporters—breached Canada’s obligation under the anti-
circumvention provisions of the SLA 2006.166 The tribunal again 
agreed with the United States, finding that certain measures 
  
 161 Knox, supra note 14, at 436. See generally Lysons, supra note 66, at 430 
(noting that the dispute settlement provision of the SLA 2006 is “evidence of lessons 
learned in the softwood lumber dispute”). 
 162 SLA 2006, supra note 2, at art. XI(1). 
 163 See Lysons, supra note 66, at 431 tbl.2 (noting the faster schedule 
stipulated in the SLA 2006 as compared to NAFTA and the WTO). 
 164 United States v. Canada, Request for Arbitration, ¶¶ 12-14 (LCIA Aug. 13, 
2007), http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/us_request_for_arbitration.pdf.  
 165 United States v. Canada, Case No. 7941, Award on Remedies, at 148 (LCIA 
Feb. 23, 2009), http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/award_on_remedy.pdf.  
 166 United States v. Canada, Request for Arbitration, ¶ 4 (LCIA Jan. 18, 
2008), http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/provincial_us_request_for_arbitration.pdf. 
The “Anti-circumvention” provision of the SLA 2006 states that “[n]either 
Party . . . shall take action to circumvent or offset the commitments under the SLA 
2006.” SLA 2006, supra note 2, at art. XVII. 
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taken by Canada violated its obligations under the agreement.167 
Yet, the tribunal sided with Canada on how to calculate the 
remedy and granted significantly less compensation than was 
initially sought by the United States.168 Following this ruling, 
both Canada and the United States offered their continued 
support for the agreement.169 Given the litigious back and forth of 
Lumber IV, these responses are encouraging.170  
The most recent Request for Arbitration, brought by the 
United States in early 2011, involved U.S. allegations that 
timber harvested from public lands in British Columbia’s 
interior region was being sold at prices below those provided 
for under the timber pricing system, which was grandfathered 
under the SLA 2006.171 Canada fought these allegations, 
arguing that the increased amount of low-priced timber from 
British Columbia was the result of a mountain pine beetle 
infestation and was not a violation of the SLA 2006’s anti-
circumvention provisions.172 In July of 2012, the LCIA sided 
with Canada and dismissed the U.S. claims in their entirety.173 
Although the Lumber Coalition was “very disappointed” with 
the ruling, it has reiterated its “respect and appreciat[ion] [for] 
the efforts of [the LCIA] and the U.S. government to grapple 
with the complex issues involved in this case.”174  
  
 167 United States v. Canada, Case No. 81010, Award, ¶ 415 (LCIA Jan. 20, 
2011), http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/2573. 
 168 Id.  
 169 Barrie McKenna, Lumber Deal Still A Good One Despite New Arbitration 
Loss, Ottawa Says, GLOBE & MAIL (Can.), Jan. 21, 2011; Lumber Deal is Safe, Emerson 
has Heard, TORONTO STAR, Mar. 6, 2008, at B2 (noting that the Canadian trade 
minister received assurances from the United States Trade Representative that the 
SLA 2006 was safe). Following the ruling, the president of the Quebec Forest Industry 
Council stated that, “[t]he Canadian government has indicated it intends to comply 
with the ruling and impose the additional export charges by the end of February 
[2011].” U.S. Prevails in Lumber Dispute with Canada, But Falls Short on Remedy, 29 
INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Jan. 28, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR 1763804. 
 170 See supra Part II.  
 171 United States v. Canada, Case No. 111790, Request for Arbitration, ¶ 4 
(LCIA Jan. 18, 2011), http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/2484.  
 172 United States v. Canada, Case No. 111790, Canada’s Response to Request for 
Arbitration, ¶¶ 1-6 (LCIA, Feb. 17, 2011), http://www.international.gc.ca/controls-
controles/assets/pdfs/softwood/Resp_Req_%20Arbitration_Can_2011_02_17%20.pdf 
(alleging that the United States has attempted to “create a violation of the SLA out of the 
devastation inflicted on the forests of British Columbia by the Mountain Pine Beetle”).  
 173 United States v. Canada, Case No. 111790, Final Award, ¶ 439 (LCIA July 26, 
2012), http://www.international.gc.ca/controls-controles/assets/pdfs/softwood/111790.pdf. 
 174 Press Release, U.S. Lumber Coal., U.S. Lumber Coalition Disappointed by 
Arbitral Decision Regarding British Columbia Softwood Lumber Agreement Timber 
Pricing Violations (July 18, 2012), available at http://www.uslumbercoalition.org/ 
doc/press_release_07-18-12.pdf. 
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Despite these continued disputes, the extension of the 
SLA 2006 offers the best hope for lumber peace to both Canada 
and the United States. Without first addressing the underlying 
conflicts between the dispute settlement mechanisms in NAFTA 
and the WTO, a return of the softwood lumber hydra, in the 
form of a prospective “Lumber V,” would force the parties back 
into a costly and ineffective system of trade litigation.  
IV. WHY THE 2006 SOFTWOOD LUMBER AGREEMENT IS 
RIGHT FOR SOFTWOOD LUMBER 
Supporters of the SLA 2006 extension argued that it has 
“brought an element of stability and predictability to trade in 
softwood lumber products.”175 Those who wished to see it expire 
derided it as protectionist and claimed that it “reduces the 
incentive for the U.S. [lumber] producers . . . to increase 
production and improve efficiency of their mills so as to be 
internationally competitive,” which ultimately has a negative 
economic effect on consumers.176 While there is truth to both of 
these statements, a negotiated agreement that streamlines the 
dispute settlement process is necessary to offset the United 
States’ aggressive support for its softwood lumber industry. 
Furthermore, although the SLA 2006 is not a complete victory 
for either country, new trading partners have the potential to 
alleviate the remaining tensions between the parties, increasing 
the likelihood that the SLA 2006 extension will bring internal 
peace to the softwood lumber dispute. 
A. A Stable and Predictable Dispute Resolution Mechanism 
Is Needed to Offset the United States’ Obdurate Political 
Protection of Its Softwood Lumber Industry 
An exasperated Prime Minister Jean Chretien once 
reminded President George W. Bush, “You want gas, you want 
oil and you don’t want wood? It’s too bad, but if you have free 
  
 175 Letter from David A. Yocis et al., Picard Kentz & Rowe LLP, on behalf of the 
U.S. Lumber Coal., to Mary Sullivan Smith, Dir. for Can. Affairs, Office of the U.S. Trade 
Rep. (Oct. 14, 2011), http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=USTR-2011-0011-
0004 (follow “View Attachment: PDF” hyperlink) [hereinafter Yocis, USTR Comment].  
 176 Howard, USTR Comment, supra note 155 (labeling homebuilders, 
remodelers, and homebuyers as “downstream consumers”). The National Association of 
Home Builders, whose members construct approximately 80% of the new homes built 
each year in the United States, is a trade association whose “mission is to enhance the 
climate for housing and the building industry.” Id.  
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trade, you have free trade.”177 While this statement is 
theoretically sound, in reality trade does not exist in isolation, 
and when it is influenced by political favoritism, economic logic 
does not always prevail.178 The United States has shown 
tremendous political resolve in its commitment to protect its 
softwood lumber industry and has brazenly used controversial 
litigation tactics in order to stretch the limits of that protection. 
Conversely, such steadfastness does not exist north of the 
border. Until U.S. resolve is weakened or until the overlapping 
dispute settlement mechanisms of global trade are 
disentangled in a way that prevents disingenuous litigation, a 
negotiated agreement with a single dispute resolution forum is 
the only outcome capable of guiding softwood lumber through 
the current mix of regionalism and multilateralism in the 
international trading regime. 
1. Political Support Within the United States for Trade 
Restrictions on Canadian Softwood Lumber 
Influential Senators from lumber-producing states, such 
as Max Baucus (D-Mont.), have long expressed their desire for 
a negotiated settlement to the lumber dispute in order to limit 
imports of Canadian softwood products. In an attempt to 
“spark a return . . . to the negotiating table,” Baucus went so 
far as to introduce the Softwood Lumber Duties Liquidation 
Act in 2004, which sought to liquidate $3 billion in Canadian 
duty deposits prior to the resolution of ongoing legal appeals 
surrounding those deposits.179 Although Canadian lumber 
industry insiders downplayed the legislation, characterizing it as 
a “message bill and not a serious threat,” evidence indicates that 
past U.S. Presidents have responded to Senators’ softwood lumber 
demands by supporting restrictions on imports of Canadian 
  
 177 Barry Brown, Lumber Dispute Could Affect State’s Imports of Canadian 
Gas, BUFFALO NEWS, Aug. 23, 2001, at E1. 
 178 See, e.g., Daniel N. Adams, Comment, Back to Basics: The Predestined 
Failure of NAFTA Chapter 19 and Its Lessons for the Design of International Trade 
Regimes, 22 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 205, 228 (2008) (noting that the SLA 2006 was a 
bargain “heavily influenced by political considerations”). During a 2009 Canada-United 
States Law Institute Conference on “North American Dispute Resolution,” John Terry, 
a Canadian trade lawyer, argued that, “despite the dispute settlement mechanisms 
[Canada has] put into place, realpolitik tends to continue to play the role it has always 
or has traditionally played.” John A. Terry, Canadian Speaker, North American 
Dispute Resolution, Proceedings of the Canadian-United States Law Institute 
Conference (Apr. 2-4, 2009), in 34 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 399, 416 (2010). 
 179 Baucus Pressures Canada on Lumber with Bill to Liquidate Duties, INSIDE 
U.S. TRADE, Nov. 19, 2004, available at 2004 WLNR 10906271. 
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lumber.180 Indeed, evidence from both Lumber III and Lumber IV 
shows that such demands were catalysts for trade restrictions.  
After Canada notified the United States of its plans to 
withdraw from the MOU signed during Lumber II,181 a group of 
sixty-four Senators wrote a letter to the President, demanding 
that the Administration take action against Canada.182 The 
letter threatened that “if [diplomatic or trade] remedies are not 
pursued, we are prepared to find a legislative remedy to fully 
offset Canada’s timber subsidies.”183 Lumber III was initiated in 
the immediate wake of this threat, with Commerce self-
initiating trade proceedings against Canada.184 Then, with the 
SLA 1996 set to expire, a group of fifty-one Senators wrote to 
the President, urging him “to make resolving the problem of 
subsidized lumber imports from Canada a top trade priority.”185 
The response to this petition was Lumber IV, launched on the 
first business day after the 1996 agreement expired.186 At 
minimum, these two letters coincided with major events in the 
softwood lumber dispute and highlight the broad level of 
political protection enjoyed by the U.S. lumber industry.187 Most 
  
 180 Id. In all four rounds of the softwood lumber dispute, Senators involved 
themselves indirectly in the negotiations by writing letters to the President, 
Commerce, and the USTR, urging them to resolve the dispute through negotiation with 
Canada or by imposing trade restrictions. Daowei Zhang & David Laband, From 
Senators to the President: Solve the Lumber Problem or Else, 123 PUB. CHOICE 393, 
393-94 (2005) (conducting a roll call analysis to identify the factors influencing a 
Senator’s willingness to sign letters demanding that the executive branch solve the 
lumber problem and showing that the economic importance of the lumber industry in a 
Senator’s home state is positively correlated with signatory on these letters and that 
the presence of a large housing industry in a state makes a Senator less likely to sign 
these letters). 
 181 See supra Part I.B. 
 182 Zhang & Laband, supra note 180, at 397. 
 183 Id. 
 184 See supra Part I.C. 
 185 Zhang & Laband, supra note 180, at 399. 
 186 See supra Part II. 
 187 Commentators argue that these Senators are influenced by the highly 
effective lobbying efforts of the Lumber Coalition. Zhang & Laband, supra note 180, at 
407 (arguing that their findings are consistent with the “interest group theory of 
political decision making” whereby a “small but concentrated softwood lumber industry 
can successfully lobby their elected officials such as Senators and demand protection 
from foreign competition, despite the fact that such protectionism harms the economic 
welfare of the nation as a whole”). Although the Lumber Coalition has faced opposition 
in its quest to impose trade penalties on Canadian lumber, primarily from the National 
Association of Home Builders, the opposition has proven ineffective in its lobbying 
efforts as compared to the Lumber Coalition. Id. at 396, 398. As recently as 2011, 
Lumber Coalition officials have publicly stated that, “in the absence of an agreement 
between the two governments, the Coalition would have no choice but to petition for 
new antidumping and countervailing duty orders against unfairly traded softwood 
lumber products from Canada.” Yocis, USTR Comment, supra note 175. Considering 
the Lumber Coalition filed fresh AD/CVD petitions on the first business day after the 
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recently, at least twenty-three members of Congress formally 
offered their support for the SLA 2006 extension.188 In a letter 
to the United States Trade Representative, these lawmakers 
offered their support for extending the agreement in exchange 
for an “iron clad commitment that any Canadian violations will 
be addressed in a timely and effective manner.”189  
2. Controversial Litigation Tactics Utilized by the 
United States to Protect Its Softwood Lumber 
Industry 
In addition to overt political support for trade 
restrictions, the United States has also proved willing to push 
the legal envelope in its attempts to protect its domestic 
softwood lumber industry. The most blatant example of this 
controversial gamesmanship is evident from the United States’ 
attempt to moot the unfavorable NAFTA rulings regarding the 
ITC’s injury determinations, under the guise of WTO 
compliance.190 Although the CIT denounced this particular 
practice,191 it is indicative of how far the U.S. government is 
willing to go to protect domestic lumber interests.192 Until a 
solution is found to deal with the discordant overlap of dispute 
settlement mechanisms, other opportunities to thwart the 
system will remain. Therefore, express agreements like the SLA 
2006 are—at least for the time being—essential in providing 
legal clarity and limiting the parties’ ability to manipulate the 
incongruous relationship between NAFTA and the WTO.193  
  
expiration of SLA 1996, the parties would be well served to give credence to these 
warnings. See supra Part II. One commentator also notes that the SLA 2006 delivered 
$500 million to the Lumber Coalition, “many times more than enough to protect its 
interests,” which means the “[Lumber] Coalition is more than ready for trade action 
were it to think more restraints needed.” Feldman, supra note 124, at 96. 
 188 Rossella Brevetti, 23 House Lawmakers Condition Support for Lumber 
Pact Extension on Enforcement, 28 Int’l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1755 (Oct. 27, 2011). 
 189 Id. 
 190 See supra Part II.A.3. 
 191 See supra Part II.D. 
 192 BOWMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 581; Quayat, supra note 37, at 134. 
 193 See Pauwelyn & Salles, supra note 19, at 117 (arguing that the best short 
term solution to address forum shopping among international tribunals is to regulate 
overlaps with explicit treaty clauses). 
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3. Canada’s Lackluster Response to the United States’ 
Steadfast Support of Its Lumber Industry 
In contrast to the United States’ commitment to the 
lumber trade, Canada’s support for its own lumber industry 
does not appear as steadfast. During the negotiations of the 
SLA 2006, some have argued that newly elected Canadian 
Prime Minister Stephen Harper prioritized restoring ties with 
the Bush Administration over supporting the Canadian lumber 
industry.194 Prior to announcing the SLA 2006, Canada had to 
persuade most of its softwood lumber producers to refrain from 
objecting publicly to an agreement that the industry did not 
favor.195 Today, Canada continues to waver in its support. 
Critics contend that the federal government “still strong-arms 
provincial governments to change [their] forestry practices.”196 
And the government has applauded British Columbia for 
increasing the amount of its forest land put to auction.197 These 
actions suggest that—despite numerous legal victories to the 
contrary—the Canadian federal government believes that the 
provinces do subsidize their production of exported lumber, and 
they offer a contrast to the rigid support for the industry found 
south of the border.198  
In explaining why Canadian lumber producers 
consented to the SLA 2006, the executive director of the 
Alberta Forest Products Association stated, “We picked the 
best of two bad situations.”199 This may be the most apt 
description of the current agreement. Although far from 
perfect, the SLA 2006 appeases U.S. demands for managed 
trade and provides Canada with a degree of legal certainty 
absent from the overlapping dispute settlement mechanism of 
NAFTA and the WTO. And while Canada may still have 
misgivings about its neighbor’s fickle free trade preferences, 
new markets will provide Canada with options to escape the 
restricted U.S. market, and they will offer the United States 
relief from an otherwise continued influx of Canadian products.  
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B. New Lumber Markets Will Allow Canada and the 
United States to Mitigate Any Lasting Tensions 
Throughout much of the softwood lumber dispute, the 
United States has been Canada’s only major export market for 
softwood lumber.200 Recently, however, lumber exports to China 
have grown significantly, and Canada’s reliance on the U.S. 
market has declined.201 May 2011 was the first month in which 
the value of softwood lumber from British Columbia exported 
to China outstripped that exported to the United States.202 
China’s purchases of softwood lumber from Canada grew from 
9.04% of Canadian softwood exports in 2010 to 21.4% in 2011.203 
This corresponded with a drop in Canada’s softwood exports to 
the United States, from 66.71% of total exports in 2010 to 
54.63% in 2011.204 This diversification of Canada’s lumber 
market will only alleviate U.S. concerns that too much 
Canadian lumber is entering its market, and it will provide the 
Canadian lumber industry with alternative trading options if it 
finds the terms of the SLA 2006 too onerous.  
While critics abound, and future conflicts are sure to 
emerge, the SLA 2006 both effectively slays the softwood lumber 
hydra and appeases the obdurate demands of U.S. lawmakers. 
Unfortunately, an unwanted side effect of this peace is that it 
removes a major incentive to address the monstrous dispute 
resolution system that exists beneath the softwood lumber 
dispute. In short, while the SLA 2006 is a workable solution to 
the softwood lumber dispute, it also adds to the perilous forces 
undercutting the multilateral trading system.  
V. A PYRRHIC VICTORY—WHY THE SLA 2006 ADDS TO THE 
FORCES UNDERCUTTING THE MULTILATERAL TRADING 
SYSTEM 
Before the SLA 2006 was signed, commentators 
predicted that the new dispute settlement system proposed in 
the agreement “spell[ed] the end of NAFTA’s [C]hapter 19, and 
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in many ways the end of NAFTA itself.”205 If this were the 
lasting impact of the SLA 2006, it would be cause for 
celebration: a response to the failures of NAFTA would have 
highlighted a major problem brought on by the proliferation of 
PTAs—namely, discordant dispute resolution—and brought 
about the demise of one of those problematic agreements. 
Unfortunately, this did not occur, and Chapter 19 is still used 
today.206 Indeed, since 2006, the most bitter trade dispute in 
North America has been immunized from many of the problems 
caused by the existence of PTAs. Unless Canada and the 
United States recognize that the SLA 2006’s straightforward 
dispute settlement mechanism is what has alleviated their 
softwood lumber problems and choose to apply a similarly 
coherent principle to the larger trading regime, the extension of 
the SLA 2006 is, at most, a Pyrrhic victory.  
A. A Dispute Settlement Cacophony—The Problems with 
Preferential Trade Agreements 
Although some argue that “overlapping legal systems 
[are] unavoidable” in today’s global landscape,207 the softwood 
lumber dispute presents a telling example of the “wastefulness 
and potential futility” of such overlap in hotly contested trade 
disputes.208 Specifically, the unresolved fragmentation between 
regionalism and multilateralism creates at least three serious 
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problems for the current international trade dispute settlement 
system.209 
First, it prolongs the underlying dispute.210 Despite 
numerous legal victories over the course of Lumber IV, it took 
Canada over five years to slay the softwood lumber hydra.211 
Moreover, the longer the dispute carried on, the more 
opportunities there were for U.S. agencies to issue additional 
determinations, each of which started the challenge process 
anew.212 Second, when multiple forums address the same issue, 
the possibility of inconsistent judgments increases.213 In 
particular, state practices, such as the United States’ use of 
zeroing, may be deemed valid in one forum and invalid in 
another.214 Finally, the existence of multiple forums gives rise to 
litigious gamesmanship. If a state is able to win even a partial 
affirmation of an AD/CVD ruling, as the United States did at 
the WTO during Lumber IV,215 its trade agencies may argue 
that, notwithstanding adverse rulings in one forum, success in 
another provides legal cover to ignore the unfavorable result.  
During the course of the softwood lumber dispute, the 
relationship among the various dispute settlement forums 
spanned a “continuum from deference to defiance,”216 but there 
was an ever-present possibility that one of the issues discussed 
above would surface and derail any apparent progress. Canada 
and the United States addressed this concern by drafting a 
PTA sub-agreement, the SLA 2006, which effectively trumped 
NAFTA and the WTO with a new dispute resolution 
mechanism exclusively for softwood lumber disputes.217 As will 
be shown below, this was a misguided attempt to solve a much 
deeper problem.  
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B. PTA Sub-Agreements Deter a Return to Multilateral 
Trade 
While PTAs have their own set of problems, the 
additional risks of PTA sub-agreements are twofold. They both 
pilfer from the finite amount of human and administrative 
capital available to conduct trade agreements, and they remove 
incentives to address the larger issues at stake.  
One of critics’ main concerns with the proliferation of 
PTAs is that their negotiation, ratification, implementation, and 
enforcement come at the expense of the multilateral system.218 
PTA sub-agreements take this problem one step further by 
focusing additional human and administrative energy on 
agreements that are further removed from multilateral objectives. 
This would not be a cause for concern if these sub-agreements 
solved the fundamental shortcomings of PTAs. Unfortunately, 
agreements such as the SLA 2006 merely immunize certain key 
industries from the drawbacks of PTAs while leaving others to 
languish in an entangled mess of trade agreements.  
The SLA 2006 acknowledges the problems with bilateral 
agreements, yet it provides the largest trade dispute in 
Canadian-American relations with immunity from those 
problems. As of 2006, the “longest running and perhaps most 
bitter trade dispute ever between the two countries” is no longer 
saddled with a cacophony of dispute settlement mechanisms.219 
With billions in trade now beyond the convoluted interplay 
between NAFTA and the WTO, Canada and the United States 
are that much less likely to address the problems of overlapping 
jurisdiction.220 While the saying is that things get worse before 
they get better, those in the multilateral trading community 
might worry that PTA sub-agreements are an example of things 
getting better before they get worse.  
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CONCLUSION 
Softwood lumber’s termite problem is an infestation 
that concerns the entire trading community, and PTA sub-
agreements are not the insecticide that the multilateral system 
is waiting for. If Canada and the United States are to assist in 
addressing the real issues at stake, they must look beyond 
creating a solution only for lumber. Rather than allowing an 
armistice in the softwood lumber dispute to serve as an excuse 
to ignore the concerns surrounding PTAs, the two parties must 
recognize why the SLA 2006 has been able to mitigate the 
dispute and extend that rationale to the greater disconnect 
between NAFTA and the WTO.  
The SLA 2006 replaces a discordant dispute settlement 
scheme with a straightforward and efficient arbitral tribunal. 
Until Canada and the United States integrate a similar 
solution into the larger trading system, the lessons of the 
softwood lumber dispute will continue to go unheeded. 
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